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Executive Summary 
ES1.      This interim report of a continuing study examines the effectiveness of international         
regulations on ships' sulphur emissions, based on observation of ship inspections in the UK and 
Sweden and on interviews with regulators, inspectors and industry stakeholders. 
ES2.      There is currently a ‘culture of compliance’ in the industry, with the proportion of ship 
detentions as a percentage of Paris MoU inspections falling from 9% in 2001 to just 3% in 2010. But 
in this highly competitive industry, operator compliance depends crucially on the perception that 
one’s competitors are also compliant – the ‘level playing field’.  
ES3.     Only fragmentary lab-test evidence of compliance levels is available. On the one hand, some 
commercial laboratories have made available summaries of the test results from large numbers of 
samples sent to them for commercial purposes. These results are mainly valuable as an indicator of 
the proportions of off-spec fuel being supplied as bunkers, rather than as an indicator of regulatory 
avoidance, since ship operators practising regulatory avoidance are unlikely to send samples for 
testing. On the other hand, some authorities (such as the Swedish Maritime Administration and the 
Dutch Water Police) are collecting quasi random fuel samples for testing, but the numbers of such 
samples are small and some of the sampling may be intelligence -led. In the first quarter of 2011, 
3.8% of samples, collected in Western Europe and the Baltic and sent to one large commercial lab 
testing agency, proved to have non-compliant sulphur levels. Most of these samples were only 
marginally off-spec, and there were considerable local differences, with only 1.5% of Rotterdam 
samples being off-spec. Test results on 149 samples collected by the Swedish Maritime 
Administration (partly quasi randomly and partly during Port-State inspections) showed only 4% 
were non-compliant (allowing for a margin of error of +/- 0.05%). Overall, the available test evidence 
is insufficient to estimate compliance levels across the ECAs as a whole. 
ES4.   If regulatory avoidance is occurring, it may be linked to the very great cost savings to be made 
from operating with low-cost, high-sulphur fuel at a time when shipping industry profits and freight 
rates are low. The imminent arrival of the new North American Emission Control Area (in August 
2012) will ensure a continuing very large price differential between compliant and non-compliant 
fuel in the medium term. The considerable financial incentives associated with using non-compliant 
fuel suggest the need for particularly robust enforcement measures. 
ES5.   Enforcement practice varies across different Paris MoU States. UK Port-State control (PSC) 
makes documentary checks, particularly on the Bunker Fuel Delivery Note (BFDN) and the Oil Record 
Book (recording the changeover from non-compliant to compliant fuel). In addition to document 
checks, Sweden takes around 200 fuel samples per year for subsequent lab analysis. These samples 
have been taken since 1998 as part of the monitoring system for Sweden’s environme ntally 
differentiated fairway dues, and are taken partly on a random basis and partly as a part of PSC 
inspections. Although they do not form part of this UK-Swedish comparative study, the Dutch and 
German authorities have a different procedure, using on-board sampling-and-testing kits. The 
Swedish test results are not available until after the vessel has left port and the penalties of non-
compliance are limited (no State prosecutions to date, but the flag-State is informed of the non-
compliance and eligibility is forfeited for discounted fairway dues), but the crew’s observation of the 
sample-taking is itself believed to exercise some deterrent effect. 
ES6. Neither the BFDN nor the Oil Record Book are documents that were originally designed to have 
a statutory function. The BFDN in particular is not always in English, does not always state the 
sulphur level on the note itself (as opposed to the printed annexed documents), does not carry the 
Registration Number of the bunkerer, is frequently hand-written, and (as a carbon copy) it is 
sometimes unreadable. 
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ES7. Inadvertent non-compliance may occur particularly among vessels with single service tanks. 
Such vessels may have undergone a changeover from high-sulphur to low-sulphur heavy fuel oil 
prior to entering the ECA, but a small residue of high-sulphur within the service tank may remain and 
be sufficient to mingle with the low-sulphur (with a typical sulphur level only just below the 1% cap) 
and thus render the vessel non-compliant. Single service tank vessels undergoing changeover 
procedures which entail the partial emptying of the service tank prior to bunkering with low sulphur 
fuel may be at risk of engine breakdown if the emptying is taken too far or if bunkering is delayed. 
Although specialist advice is available on changeover procedures, changeovers have been observed 
to differ substantially between different chief engineers operating the same vessel at different 
times. 
ES8.  Not all bunkering operations (and associated MARPOL samplings) proceed as they should, 
particularly in the bunkering of smaller vessels in smaller ports. Not all vessels are equipped with the 
special flange to enable the crew to take a continuous ‘drip’ sample and sub-contractors operating 
delivery trucks may arrive at the ship with the samples already bottled and signed. 
ES9.  An important incentive for ship operators to comply with IMO regulations lies in the 
publication (‘naming and shaming’) on the Paris MoU’s THETIS database (and subsequently on 
industry databases such as EQUASIS) of a vessel’s inspection record. However, vessels that are non-
compliant with respect to the EU directive on the burning of 0.1% sulphur fuel in port are not 
‘named and shamed’ on THETIS or EQUASIS, because the 0.1% port sulphur cap is not an IMO 
regulation, and incentives towards compliance are consequently reduced. 
ES10. It is not currently possible to enforce ECA sulphur regulations on vessels transiting the ECAs 
through the territorial waters of EU countries, bound for non-EU ports where PSC may be less 
effective. 
ES11. A list of seven recommendations appears below. 
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Introduction 
1. This project is funded by the UK’s Economic & Social Research Council (grant reference: RES-
062-23-2644) and has the support of the UK’s Maritime & Coastguard Agency. We also 
gratefully acknowledge the help of the Swedish Sjofartsverket (Swedish Maritime 
Administration) and the Swedish Transportstyrelsen (Swedish Transport Agency). The 
project began 1/9/2010 and finishes 31/12/2012. This is an interim report.  
 
2. The project draws on observation of ship inspections in selected UK and Swedish ports, and 
interviews with inspectors, regulators and shipping industry stakeholders, with the objects 
of both assessing the effectiveness of current enforcement of controls on ships’ SOx 
emissions in the North Sea and Baltic Emission Control Areas (ECAs), and of offering 
suggestions to regulators on the enforcement of possible future regulations on carbon 
emissions. 
 
3. Fieldwork and interviewing are still continuing. To date (17/11/11), 36 interviews have been 
completed and 16 ship inspections have been observed. In addition, some background 
statistical data have been collected, namely records of Falmouth bunker deliveries and 
records of the test results from Swedish fuel samples. 
 
 Summary of the Relevant Regulations 
1. Annex VI of IMO’s MARPOL convention is concerned with regulations for the prevention of 
air pollution; Regulation 13 is concerned with NOx emissions, while Regulation 14 is 
concerned with SOx and particulate matter. The initial Annex VI regulations on SOx entered 
into force 19/5/05 and revised regulations on 1/7/10. Mandatory measures to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs) will come into force 1/1/13, requiring all ships to have a 
Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP) and all newly built ships to comply with 
the Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI). The signatories to Annex VI have merchant fleets 
totalling 85% of the world’s tonnage. The regulations apply to all ships over 400 gross 
tonnage. All except the smallest ships must carry a current International Air Pollution 
Certificate, certified by class. Emission Control Areas (ECAs) were set up in the Baltic (2006) 
and the North Sea/English Channel (2007), a third ECA will come into force in North America 
in 2013. Initially, the sulphur limit on fuel in the ECAs was set at 1.5%, reducing to 1.00 on 
1/7/10 and further reducing to 0.1% on 1/1/15. At time of writing (26/10/11), the UK has 
not yet issued an update to Merchant Shipping Notice 1819, reducing the sulphur limit from 
1.5% to 1.0%. The world-wide sulphur cap was initially set at 4.5%, reducing to 3.5% on 
1/1/12. A further world-wide reduction to 0.5% is projected for 1/1/2020, subject to a 
review respecting fuel availability to be completed by 2018 – if the review is unfavourable, 
then the 0.5% limit will be postponed to 1/1/2025.  
 
2. In addition to these global regulations, the EU has introduced, from January 2010, an 
additional requirement for all ships at berth (and at anchor within port limits) to burn fuel 
with 0.1% sulphur. Additionally, there is an EU ban on sales of distillate fuel with sulphur 
content greater than 0.1%. An earlier (1999) EU Directive had set a cap on fuel burned on 
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inland waterways. In Sweden, since 1998, the fairway dues (levied on all berthing ships to 
cover the costs of ice-breaking and navigation lights) have been differentiated according to 
whether vessels attest to continuous burning of low-sulphur fuel and/or whether the vessels 
have NOx-efficient engines. In addition, all the major Swedish ports operate differentiated 
port charges for vessels attesting to continuous burning of low-sulphur fuel. The fairway 
dues are substantial: the maximum charge per port call for an oil tanker is SEK 77,000 
(£7,200), plus a charge of 70 ore (i.e. 5p) per gross tonne for using fuel with a sulphur 
content greater than 0.5% (i.e. half that permitted under the ECA regulations)1. The Swedish 
port charges vary from port to port, but are smaller than the fairway dues. In Gothenburg, 
Sweden’s largest port, there is no extra charge for vessels using less than 0.2% sulphur, for 
vessels using 0.2 – 05% sulphur the charge is 10 ore (ie 0.7 pence) per gross tonne, for 
vessels over 0.5% sulphur the charge is 20 ore. In the view of one Swedish port official: ‘My 
gut feeling is that it has only a marginal effect – our fees haven’t been so high that they are 
proportional to the cost of switching to a better fuel’. 
 
The Culture of Compliance 
1. Port State Control (PSC), that is the equal enforcement of international shipping regulations 
by the port State regardless of a ship’s flag, was introduced (in 1982) because some ship 
owners were effectively evading international regulations by ‘flagging out’ to commercial 
registries, some of which lacked the capacity and/or political will to enforce international 
regulations. This regulatory avoidance was hazardous to life and to the environment, but 
was stimulated by the potential cost savings to be made from such avoidance in a highly 
competitive industry. For example, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (1996) estimated that a bulk carrier carrying two fewer crew than the 
statutory requirement would save $37,000 pa2. Port State Control seeks to penalise 
regulatory avoidance by targeted policing and by ‘naming and shaming’. In respect of 
targeting, ships deemed to be a greater risk of non-compliance for whatever reason (for 
example, age, flag, previous inspection record) can expect to be inspected more frequently – 
thus, an elderly coaster inspected in 2011 had been previously inspected by PSC 35 times 
1992-2010. And, in respect of naming and shaming, a vessel’s inspection record is published 
on the Paris MoU website (and re-published on industry websites such as EQUASIS), which 
influences commercial decisions by charterers, insurers and others, and which in turn 
influence the freight rates that a vessel can command in the market place. As a result, most 
ship operators are incentivised to proactively comply with ship regulations. Thus, the 
following message, which posted on the wall in the Master’s office, from the CEO of a Far 
Eastern shipping company: “2011 Yearly Aims: 
1. Detention zero by PSC inspection 
2. Save costs. Cut down 5% against the 2010 year’s budget for repairs (including dry-dock 
repair) and stores 
3. Reduce the personnel injury on board by half against 2010 year 
4. High risk zero and observation less than 5 items by Oil Major Inspection [i.e. the SIRE 
inspections operated by the industry on oil tankers]”. 
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2. Further incentives to compliance should be noted. The differentiated Swedish fairway dues 
(and to a lesser extent, the differentiated Swedish port charges) offer financial incentives for 
vessels using Swedish ports to operate continuously with low sulphur fuel. Additionally, 
some operators have found PR value in having a ‘green profile’: the car carrier operator, 
Wallenius Wilhelmsen, has been operating continuously on low sulphur fuel since 1995 – a 
decision displayed prominently on its website 3. And Swedish ferry companies dispose of all 
their toilet waste ashore, although there is no statutory requirement of them to do so. For 
the same reason, some charterers may require operators to run vessels continuously on low 
sulphur fuel. Thus, the ocean-going tugs that tow oil rigs all operate continuously on low-
sulphur marine gas oil because they are required to do so by the oil companies under the 
terms of their charters. 
  
3.  While it is difficult to estimate the relative importance of these different influences – 
frequent PSC policing, PSC naming-and-shaming, green profile PR, demands from charterers 
– it seems clear that this has led to an overall improvement in compliance levels over time. 
Ship detentions in the Paris MoU (covering UK, European and Canadian ports) fell from 
1,699 vessels in 2001 (comprising 9% of all ship inspections) to 790 in 2010 (comprising 3% 
of all ship inspections)4. There is now said to be a ‘culture of compliance’ in the industry. 
 
4. Levels of compliance with the sulphur regulations ought to estimable from published results 
of tests on fuel samples, but the evidence is too fragmentary and rather contradictory.  The 
Dutch authorities have been taking small numbers of fuel samples for testing since 1999. 
Alarm bells rang in the shipping press in 2011 when Meindert Vink of the Netherlands 
Shipping Inspectorate presented findings from 135 fuel samples taken in the port of 
Rotterdam in 20105. These showed that in the first six months of 2010 (when an ECA sulphur 
limit of 1.5% was in force), the non-compliance level was 7% (from 72 samples), whereas in 
the second six months of 2010 (when an ECA sulphur limit of 1.0% was in force) the non-
compliance level had risen to 46% (from 63 samples). However, this alarm may have been 
misplaced. While, in theory, these 135 samples are meant to be randomly drawn (from 
34,000 ocean-going vessel arrivals and 108,000 inland vessel arrivals per annum), it is in fact 
unclear how far the sampling is intelligence -led, arising out of complaints from harbour 
authorities and others. It might be thought that more credence would attach to the report 
published by the technical manager of one of the major test laboratories, Lintec Testing 
Services Ltd, based on tests of the very much larger number of samples taken for 
commercial purposes. While some of these samples will have been sent for testing because 
of commercial disputes, the great majority are sent routinely as a matter of company policy 
by ship operators. The Lintec data for the first quarter of 2011 showed that 1.5% of all fuel 
samples taken in Rotterdam, and sent to Lintec for te sting, had excess sulphur content6. 
However, most of the Lintec samples were only marginally off-spec and it must be allowed 
that ship operators consciously seeking to avoid complying with the low-sulphur regulations 
would be unlikely to send samples for commercial testing. Nevertheless, the Dutch Shipping 
Inspectorate figure of 46% may be less than reliable as an indicator of ship operator non-
compliance: the number of samples is small; the sampling may have been partly intelligence-
led; and some, at least, of the non-compliant samples may have been the result of the 
supply of off-spec bunkerers rather than regulatory avoidance.  
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5. The overall Lintec figure for samples with non-compliant sulphur levels drawn from Western 
Europe and the Baltic region is 3.8%. As stated previously, non-compliant fuel need not 
imply regulatory avoidance by the ship operator: the vessel may simply have been supplied 
with off-spec fuel by the bunkerer, without the operator’s knowledge. The report does not 
state what proportion of the 3.8% non-compliant samples were only fractionally off-spec, 
but in a personal communication the author has indicated to us that most of the samples 
that were non-compliant in respect of sulphur were only marginally off-spec; this would 
indicate that in most cases the operators are inadvertently non-compliant, rather than 
engaging in regulatory avoidance. However, again it should be borne in mind that any 
operator consciously engaging in regulatory avoidance is unlikely to be sending fuel samples 
for testing.  
 
6. If the Rotterdam samples are excluded from the Lintec testing total, then the figure is 
around 5% for Western Europe and the Baltic. An earlier unpublished compilation by the 
European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) of test results from commercial samples collected 
at a time when the ECA sulphur limit was 1.5% had reportedly also shown a 5% non-
compliance level7. So there is no clear evidence that non-compliance (inadvertent or not) 
has been increasing over time.  
 
7. The Swedish Maritime Administration has kindly made available the results of tests on 
samples that they conduct as part of the enforcement of their environmentally 
differentiated fairway dues. Tests on samples taken from 149 vessels in 2010 (the same year 
as the Rotterdam tests) and, allowing for a margin of error in sulphur content of +/- 0.05%, 
show that only 6 vessels (i.e. 4%) were found to have non-compliant heavy fuel oil8. While 
some of these samples are collected on a random basis, others are collected as part of PSC 
inspections (and are thus partly intelligence -led). The only other test evidence we have 
found within the public domain comes from Danish Maritime Administration sampling in 
2008, where 3 samples out of 54 were found to be of non-compliant fuel8. 
 
8. In some parts of the globe (notably, South America and Caribbean) low sulphur fuel may be 
unobtainable. Operators who have been able to provide documentary evidence to the MCA 
of their unsuccessful efforts to obtain compliant bunkers at their last port are allowed by the 
MCA to proceed to bunker at Falmouth or Portland without penalty. Additionally and more 
importantly, a vessel may have been supplied with off-spec fuel by the bunkerer without the 
knowledge of the operator. Not all vessels are fitted with the special flange on the bunker 
fuel access pipe which enables the crew to take a proper continuous and independent ‘drip’ 
sample. And some bunker suppliers (particularly sub-contractors operating delivery trucks) 
may arrive with the samples already bottled and signed. Further, in the case of the many 
vessels with only a single service tank (i.e. the day tank supplying the main engine, as 
opposed to storage tanks), the excess sulphur level may simply be the result of faulty 
changeover procedure – see ‘Problems of Effective Enforcement’ below.  
 
9. Other (non-sampling) evidence bearing on compliance should be mentioned. Bunkering 
operations at Falmouth, which lies just at the western boundary of the ECA, has experienced 
a major boom from shipping without compliant fuel, seeking to bunker with compliant fuel 
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before entering the ECA. One of the two bunkering operations in Falmouth kindly made 
available some of their activity data: 369 vessels bunkered there in 2006; this rose to 1304 
vessels in 20089. It has been suggested that a laser technology, LIDA R, can be used to 
analyse the sulphur content in a ship’s exhaust plume and the Swedish Maritime 
Administration has experimented with mounting LIDAR equipment on a spotter plane, but 
this experiment was discontinued because of technical difficulties and concerns about 
aircrew safety. We understand that LIDAR would only have been used as a screening device: 
identifying potentially non-compliant vessels which would, on berthing, have been boarded 
for inspectors to take fuel samples for analysis. However, LIDAR equipment was mounted at 
the entry to the port of Gothenburg to analyse the exhaust plumes of more than 2,000 
vessels and found 5% of these to be seemingly non-compliant10. 
 
10.  From the available evidence, therefore, it appears that the majority of ships in the ECAs are 
operating with compliant fuel. However, a significant minority of vessels appear to be non-
compliant. Ships operating continuously in the ECAs, such as ferries, coastal traders and 
North Sea rig supply and support vessels, are particularly likely to be compliant – such ships 
undergo frequent PSC inspections and many operate continuously on low-sulphur distillate 
fuel (MGO). Ships calling at ports where the operator is aware that fuel may be sampled by 
the authorities, such as Rotterdam and the Swedish ports, may also be significantly more 
likely to be compliant. Vessels calling at Swedish ports are also offered financial incentives 
towards compliance. Note however that ships transiting Swedish waters en route for non-
Swedish ports such as St Petersburg (where PSC in the past has been shown to be less 
effective11) are not subject to sample-testing and may well be more likely to be non-
compliant. The shipping industry’s new-found culture of compliance may be imperilled in 
respect of compliance with the sulphur regulations. 
 
Fuel Price Differentials 
The potential savings quoted by the OECD, and reported above, for operating with less than the 
statutory minimum crew are dwarfed by the savings that can be made by operating with non-
complaint fuel. Wallenius Wilhelmsen’s previously cited policy of operating continuously with low-
sulphur fuel was estimated by the company to have cost an additional $2.7 million dollars in 2009. In 
that year the price differential between low-sulphur and high-sulphur heavy fuel oil was around $10 
per tonne. In early 2011 the price differential suddenly increased to around $80 per tonne, following 
disruption to supplies of Libyan oil which has naturally low sulphur content. The price differential 
between high-sulphur heavy fuel oil and distillates is around $300 per tonne. Industry analysts are 
clear that, short of a world economic slump, the imminent enforcement of a North American in ECA 
(in August 2012) will ensure a continuing very high price differential between ECA-compliant and 
non-compliant fuel. It is estimated that, after August 2012, half of all container ship voyages will 
involve transiting an ECA. There are also concerns about future fuel availability, due to limited 
refinery capacity and burgeoning demand for distillate from China and India. As one expert 
interviewee put it: ‘In the future world, distillate will be costly, its availability will be questionable, 
and its quality will be much more variable’. 
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The Concern for a Level Playing Field 
The shipping industry is highly competitive and a combination of the current economic downturn 
and surplus capacity (due the arrival of many new-builds into the market place) has served to 
depress freight rates across most sectors. Unscrupulous operators (‘free riders’) can thus secure a 
considerable competitive advantage through regulatory avoidance. This is particularly the case for 
the use of non-compliant fuel, where the potential cost savings are very large indeed. The main 
concern of operators concerning enforcement practice regarding the sulphur regulations (as with all 
international shipping regulations) is that enforcement should be sufficiently effective to prevent 
unfair competition from free riders. Thus, a ship operator: ‘We don’t have a problem with 
enforcement because we fully comply. And we expect everyone else to fully comply’ [emphasis as in 
the original]. And a shipping industry representative: ‘I think of course we need enforcement, the 
industry wants enforcement because we don’t want people cutting the corners. So all the good ship-
owners want everybody else to be paying the same price. And that is almost the fundamental 
mantra that we follow in [the industry association]’. However, the current main concern of the 
industry is not with enforcement of the current sulphur regulations, but rather with the projected 
future tightening of the ECA regulations in 2015 entailing a sulphur limit of 0.1% (which would entail 
continuous operation in the ECAs on high-cost distillate fuel) – see for example the industry evidence 
submitted to the House of Commons Transport Select Committee Inquiry on the Implementation of 
IMO and EU Regulations on Sulphur Emissions by Ships in October 201112. Yet it is a moot point 
whether the present (fragmentary) evidence of non-compliance with the current regulations 
constitutes the ‘level playing field’ desired by the industry. 
 
Problems in Effective Enforcement 
1.  Although the Maritime & Coastguard Agency can charge operators for follow-up visits to 
detained ships, port-state control is not a revenue-generating activity and the MCA’s port-state 
inspection operations naturally face budgetary constraints. The MCA has to find budget cuts of 
22% over the period 2011-2015, as part of the UK government’s comprehensive spending 
review13. The MCA has not equipped its surveyors with the sampling kits used by Swedish 
inspectorate or with the sampling-and-testing kits used by the Dutch. Nor does the MCA have 
the technical capacity to detect non-compliant ships transiting UK waters but not destined for 
UK ports. The cost of the analysis of the samples collected by the Danish Maritime 
Administration was 150 Euros per sample14.  
 
2. As previously mentioned, the Swedish maritime authorities have experimented with a laser 
system (LIDAR) for detecting sulphur content in ships’ exhaust plumes, mounted on a spotter 
plane. In principle, this would have allowed both early warning of possibly non-compliant ships 
bound for Swedish ports, and would also identify possibly non-compliant ships transiting 
Swedish waters. The experiment was discontinued for technical and aircrew safety reasons. It 
appears that a LIDAR device mounted at port entry points (and which could be readily shifted 
from port to port as part of a random surveillance system) could potentially act as a screening 
device for identifying possibly non-compliant berthing vessels, which could then trigger 
collection of test samples of the fuel by PSC.  However, such a system would not be effective 
for screening transiting ships from the coastline of busy shipping lanes such as the Dover Straits 
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and the Oresund, partly because LIDAR detects sulphur in all the airspace between the device 
and the vessel (so that the results would be contaminated by the exhausts from multiple other 
vessels), and partly because the most likely follow-up course for the authorities would be 
simply to notify the vessel’s flag-State of a possible non-compliance, with likely limited 
consequences.    
 
3. The MCA relies for detection of non-compliance on document checks, rather than on fuel 
sampling. Paris MoU PSC inspectors (in the UK and in Sweden alike) may ask to see the Bunker 
Fuel Delivery Note (BFDN) provided by the bunker supplier, which specifies the sulphur content 
of the fuel. And PSC inspectors may ask to see the Oil Record Book which records the point at 
which the vessel both began and later completed its changeover from high-sulphur to low-
sulphur fuel. Neither of these documents was originally designed to have a statutory function 
and they are not particularly robust documents for that purpose. As one expert interviewee 
remarked: ‘The bunker delivery note is no longer just a commercial document, it is a statutory 
document as well – [the new regulations have] brought whole tiers of regulatory control to an 
existing activity’. The BFDN is not always written in English – it is expecting rather a lot of 
inspectors to require them know that ‘zwavel’ is the Dutch for ‘sulphur’. Some BFDNs for MGO 
supplied in the EU (which EU regulations require to be less than 0.1% sulphur) do not state the 
sulphur level on the note itself, but only on the printed annex to the note. The BFDN is 
frequently supplied by a sub-contractor, rather than a registered bunkerer and the Registration 
Number of the bunkerer does not appear on the delivery note. The BFDN held on the vessel is a 
carbon copy and is thus not always readable, particularly after storage. The BFDN is also 
frequently hand-written, as are the entries in the Oil Record Book. Both documents are thus 
open to fraud/forgery. Hard evidence of fraud is naturally hard to come by, however fuel 
samples taken by other maritime administrations have sometimes shown considerable 
discrepancies between the sulphur level recorded in the BFDN and that found on analysis. For 
example, the Grande Mediterraneo (IMO no. 9138393) inspected in Wallhamn, Sweden, on 
10/11/2010 was found to have Heavy Fuel Oil in the service tank that was 1.68% sulphur, while 
the BFDN recorded 0.98% sulphur15. It should be noted that regulators and industry 
stakeholders alike were aware of the frailties of the BFDN as a statutory document; one 
regulator reported that discussions had taken place about the future possibility of electronic 
bunker record-keeping. 
 
4. Although Masters are required to notify maritime administrations of their estimated times of 
arrival, this duty is normally delegated to the port authorities. However, some smaller ports are 
not notifying the MCA of arrivals and so inspections are not scheduled. Potentially, the 
European Maritime Safety Agency’s (EMSA) SafeSeaNet system monitoring ships’ AIS (radio) 
transmissions, or the Long Range Identification and Tracking – International Data Exchange 
(LRIT-IDA) also administered by EMSA, could help identify such un-notified port calls. Note that, 
while it used to be said that ship operators could avoid a PSC inspection in the UK by the 
expedient of berthing Friday afternoon to Sunday evening, in 2011 the MCA reached an 
agreement with the union about out-of-hours working. 
 
5. Specifically in respect of the EU requirement to burn fuel with a maximum of 0.1% sulphur in 
port, because this is an EU (rather than an IMO) requirement, non-compliant vessels do not 
10 
have this deficiency recorded in the Paris MoU THETIS database and or (consequently) in 
industry databases like EQUASIS. Note however that the MCA records detentions due to non-
compliant fuel on its own website (cf. the report of the detention of the Pleiades Spirit in the 
Port of Tyne for not burning 0.1% fuel at berth on 16/8/10). Thus, non-compliance with the EU 
regulations has little adverse commercial impact on the vessel’s freight rates, because ‘naming-
and-shaming’ on industry websites has not occurred. Past research on PSC has shown that the 
effectiveness of the Paris MoU is partly dependent on its ‘smart regulation’ strategy of 
incentivising ship operators to pro-actively comply with regulations by influencing the freight 
rates that vessels can command through the ‘naming and shaming’ of the non-compliant15. Not 
to name-and-shame in THETIS (a system, ironically, developed by the European agency, EMSA) 
those ships non-compliant with EU port fuel regulations is thus to reduce materially operators’ 
incentives to comply. The following notes are taken from observation of a UK PSC inspection in 
2010:  
‘ [....] the surveyor gave the ship a clean bill of health on its Paris MoU inspection, but then 
produced a different form [from the Paris MoU form] for a UK General Inspection where he 
recorded the auxiliary engines and boiler as being powered with fuel with sulphur content 
greater than 0.1%, with the deficiency to be rectified before the next port (i.e. in this case, as 
soon as the ship had bunkered and performed a fuel changeover). The captain was [....] 
mollified by being told by the surveyor that his ship would not be listed as having this deficiency 
on any database, such as SIRENAC [predecessor to THETIS] or EQUASIS. The captain asked what 
he should do with the paper copy of the UK General Inspection. The surveyor said he could 
store it with the paper copy of the Paris MoU inspection, which would go in the enormous 
binder-folder where ship certificates are kept all-together. After a moment’s deliberation, the 
captain said he would store it separately.’    
 
6. Port-State inspections follow a discretionary methodology, allowing surveyors some latitude in 
the depth and foci of inspections and in the actions required from non-compliant vessels. The 
Paris MoU Port State Control Instruction 43/2010/05 lists the PSC inspection instructions for 
the low-sulphur regulations and states that the surveyor ‘should use professional judgement to 
determine whether to detain the ship or to allow it to sail with deficiencies which do not pose 
an unreasonable threat of harm to the environment’. This discretionary element is welcomed 
by many operators, but it also leads to uncertainty about penalties which may serve to weaken 
compliance. While one surveyor might typically record non-compliant fuel as a ‘15’ deficiency 
(‘to be rectified by the next port’) his colleague in the same office might typically record it as a 
‘99’ (‘an observation to the master’). Uncertainty is not confined to the type of deficiency that 
may be recorded. EU member states which assert their right to prosecute vessels for 
contravention of air pollution regulations have not always achieved prosecutions, seemingly 
because of legal difficulties in conclusively establishing the burden of proof (for example, could 
it be proven that the test sample had not been tampered with en route to the laboratory?). The 
Swedish Maritime Administration’s programme of sampling and testing programme has not yet 
led to a single prosecution by the State Prosecutor’s Office16; and Denmark’s testing 
programme detected 10 violations of the sulphur regulations in 2006 and 2007, but these 
resulted in only one successful prosecution17. 
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7. One would expect some uncertainty must also arise among operators out of differences in 
inspection practice between different EU states, although none of the operators or shipping 
industry representatives interviewed in fact voiced any concern about these differences. This 
project has focussed on UK-Swedish practice, where (as already stated) the main difference lies 
in the Swedish practice of taking samples for testing: Swedish surveyors take around 200 
samples per annum (not all of them on PSIs – there is a deliberate element of randomness in 
the testing). These are sent away for testing and the results are never available until after the 
ship has departed, though the flag-State is notified of non-compliant test results and non-
compliant ships also l ose any preferential rates of Swedish fairway dues for which they may 
previously have been eligible. However, the Swedish surveyors believe that for the crew to 
witness the sampling procedure does itself exercise a deterrent effect. It should be noted here 
that the authorities in Holland and Germany have made available sampling-and-testing kits, so 
that test results are available during the course of an inspection and this has resulted in some 
vessels being detained for burning non-compliant fuel. It was reported to us that the Swedish 
authorities had considered the deployment of these sampling-and-testing kits but had concerns 
about the accuracy of the kit test results compared to laboratory testing. 
   
8. Vessels with a single service tank (that is, the day tank that serves the main engine, as opposed 
to storage tanks) are particularly disadvantaged by the technical difficulties entailed in 
compliance. Such a vessel may take as much as a four-day changeover period to flush low-
sulphur fuel (LSFO) through its service tank before sufficient high-sulphur fuel (HSFO) has been 
expelled to make the vessel compliant. The highly viscous HSFO leaves sticky deposits that are 
difficult to get rid of and, since the sulphur content of the LSFO is typically only marginally 
below the 1.0% limit at, say, 0.98% sulphur, only very small amounts of HSFO need to be 
retained in the service tank to be diluted with the LSFO in order to render the fuel non-
compliant. The changeover procedure on one such inspected vessel was fieldnoted to be as 
follows: 
‘...part-emptying the settlement tank (upstream from the service tank) for 4 days and 
flushing through the service tank [with LSFO]. The capacity of the settlement/service tank 
was 17 cubic metres and each day they emptied out 4 or 5 cubic metres. The main engines 
took 0.55 cubic metres of fuel per hour [i.e. 13 cubic metres every 24 hours].... because the 
fuel used for flushing/dilution was 1.0% sulphur itself, only a tiny amount of remaining HSFO 
would be required to put the vessel over the limit. Nevertheless, the vessel had been 
following a responsible and reasonable changeover procedure and had made best efforts to 
be compliant’.  
 
9. No data are available on the percentage of the world fleet with single service tanks, but single 
service tank vessels are certainly very common among older vessels and embrace a wide range 
of ship types including tankers, car carriers and large container vessels. In 11 observed 
inspections in this study where the number of service tanks was known, 8 of the vessels had 
only single service tanks and, of these, 6 were undertaking fuel changeovers (the other two 
vessels operated continuously on distillate fuel). Specialist advice is available from 
organisations such as Lloyds FOBAS on how to calculate a correct changeover period, based on 
the specifications of the fuels concerned, and the capacity and throughput of the service tank. 
But one serving Chief Engineer interviewed reported that he had adopted a much shorter 
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changeover period than his predecessor on the same vessel and there are grounds for 
suspecting that changeover practice is quite variable on the same or similar vessels. It may 
therefore be doubted whether all vessels with single service tanks are in fact burning compliant 
fuel, despite having gone through a changeover procedure. Where the changeover procedure 
involves partial drainage of the service tank prior to dilution with the LSFO, then there is a 
particular danger of engine breakdown (and consequent collision, grounding or foundering) if 
the emptying is taken too far. In California (which requires ships to burn low sulphur fuel within 
24 nautical miles of the State’s coast), the tanker Overseas Cleliamer reportedly came within 15 
feet of grounding on the rocks of the Marin Headlands near the Golden Gate Bridge due to 
engine breakdown while undertaking a fuel changeover18. Partial emptying of the service tank 
prior to bunkering with low sulphur also carries risk of engine breakdown if the bunkering is 
delayed by queuing or bad weather. Operators are aware of these problems, but many of these 
vessels have insufficient space in the engine compartment to retro-fit an additional service tank 
that would obviate the need for partial drainage. Some operators are addressing the problem 
by arranging for the service tank to be split during dry-docking. One dry-dock manager reported 
that his company had experienced a big increase in requests for this kind of retro-fitting in the 
last 3-4 years, with a particular peak in the last 1-2 years, and that competitor dry-docks were 
experiencing a similar boom in split tank retro-fitting. New-built vessels all carry extra service 
tanks, unless designed for continuous MGO operation. So this compliance problem will diminish 
over time. 
 
Conclusions  
1. This interim report will not cover issues concerning the enforcement of regulations on 
carbon emissions, since the regulatory framework on ships’ carbon emissions remains 
unclear at this time. We plan to circulate for discussion some suggestions on this topic once 
the regulatory picture becomes clearer, provided that it is within the time -scale of this 
project. Because of the very limited PSC experience with inspections of vessels with 
scrubbers, we are unable to draw any conclusions or make any recommendations on the 
monitoring of ships with ships with scrubbers. However, enquiries with dry dock managers 
do not indicate any dry-dock work on the retro-fitting of scrubbers currently taking place, so 
PSC monitoring of scrubbers is unlikely to be an important issue in the short-term. 
 
2. On the enforcement of the regulations on sulphur emissions, the evidence reported above 
leads us to conclude that it is clear that a minority of berthing ships in the UK and Sweden 
are continuing to burn non-compliant fuel. While the best estimate for non-compliance in 
Western Europe and the Baltic as a whole is 3.8%, this is largely a result of the supply of off 
spec fuel rather than conscious regulatory avoidance. No data are available on ships 
transiting UK and Swedish waters en route for, say St Petersburg, but it seems quite possible 
that rather more of these transiting vessels will be non-compliant. There is no reason to 
suppose compliance levels will be similar across different EU States in the ECA, and indeed it 
seems likely that compliance levels among berthing ships in Swedish ports may be higher 
than in the UK, and that the non-compliance figure of 4% drawn from the Swedish 
authorities’ fuel-testing programme (although based on only a very small percentage of port 
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calls) is reasonably accurate. Possible reasons for the relatively low Swedish non-compliance 
figure include: 
· The long-standing (since 1998) financial incentives to continuously burn low sulphur 
offered by the environmentally differentiated Swedish fairway dues (the 
differentiated Swedish port charges appear of only marginal effect in comparison). 
· The wish by local operators and charterers to demonstrate a green profile 
· The high proportion of berthing ships in Sweden operating continuously in the Baltic 
and/or North Sea ECAs 
· The deterrent effect of the long-standing Swedish fuel sampling programme, despite 
the limited penalties exercised against non-compliant vessels.  
It is impossible to estimate the relative importance of these different factors. 
 
3. The estimate of 3.8% overall non-compliance appears to be an indication of largely 
inadvertent non-compliance as a result of the receipt of marginally off-spec fuel, rather than 
largely the result of conscious regulatory avoidance. However, evidence is available which 
does indicate some conscious re gulatory avoidance, witness the Swedish test results from 
the Grande Mediterraneo and the UK detention of the Pleiades Spirit above. There is a 
danger that the ‘level playing field’ desired by operators may not be met and that the 
industry’s ‘culture of compliance’ may break down in this regulatory area. The major factor 
in this possible breakdown is undoubtedly the very substantial cost savings to be made by 
running on non-compliant fuel. We should also note that there is probably some additional 
inadverte nt non-compliance in respect of vessels with single service tanks operating an 
inadequate changeover procedure. 
 
4. The substantial financial incentives to use non-compliant fuel (uniquely large in respect of 
the rewards for regulatory avoidance in the shipping industry) argue the need for 
particularly effective measures of enforcement in this particular domain of PSC. Although 
there is scope for making documents like the BFDN more suitable for statutory purposes, a 
reliance solely on visual checking of docume nts does not seem appropriate to this need for 
particularly effective enforcement. 
 
5. If the EU 0.1% sulphur port fuel regulations are not to appear toothless, non-compliant 
vessels need to be ‘named and shamed’ on the EQUASIS website. 
 
Recommendations  
1. That the MCA consider piloting, as part of PSCIs, the use of both fuel sampling kits similar to 
those used in Sweden and fuel sampling-and-testing kits similar to those used in Germany 
and Holland. The sampling kits would be used in conjunction with laboratory testing. The 
pilot would provide information on: (a) the compatibility of the sampling-and-testing kits 
with ‘light-touch’ inspections; (b) the suitability of different enforcement options following a 
non-compliant lab test result (assuming that the vessel in question has already left port); 
and (c) up-to-date information on contemporary compliance levels in UK ports. 
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2. That all EU countries inform the European Commission of all vessels found to be non-
compliant in respect of the 0.1% sulphur port fuel regulations, with a view to the 
Commission seeking to ensure that these non-compliant cases appear on EQUASIS.  
 
3. We note the possibility that bunker deliveries be recorded electronically. In the absence of 
an agreement on electronic recording, we recommend that agreement should be sought at 
IMO on a new format for the Bunker Fuel Delivery Note. Consideration should be given to 
the following propositions: (a) that the BFDN should be in English; (b) that it should always 
state the sulphur content; (c) that the Registration Number of the bunkerer be recorded 
(whether or not delivery is by a sub-contractor); and (d) that the material of the BFDN be 
such that erasures or alterations to the note be visibly obvious. 
 
4. That discussions be entered into with the Paris MoU staff about the feasibility of making a 
vessel’s non-compliant fuel lab test result at the last port the occasion for a P1 inspection at 
the vessel’s next Paris MoU port.  
 
5. Further consideration needs to be given to the potential danger posed to ships with single 
service tanks changing over to compliant low sulphur fuel by means of the partial emptying 
of the service tank. For example, it may be inadvisable for such ships to have to queue for 
bunkering.  
 
6. Given the failure of the Swedish experiment to mount LIDAR equipment on a spotter plane, 
we can offer no recommendations on the monitoring of compliance by transiting, non-
berthing vessels. However, consideration could be given in future to mounting LIDAR on a 
vehicle rig for visiting ports and ‘screening’ incoming and berthing ships for possibly non-
compliant fuel, with arrangements for follow-up sampling of those identified as possibly 
non-compliant. 
 
7. There may be scope for the sharing of best inspection practice on monitoring compliance 
with fuel regulations. For example, on methods of checking the accuracy of the logged 
changeover procedure, based on the BFDNs, service tank throughput, etc. 
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